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Note 
The Right of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
to Enrich Uranium  
Kamyar Ghorbanebrahimi 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) has been negotiating its 
nuclear program with the international community since 2002.1 
As a sovereign state, Iran insists on having a peaceful nuclear 
program.2 Iran calls it an “inalienable” right.3 The president of 
Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated at a recent ceremony in Tehran 
that “[n]ot only nuclear energy, but also nuclear technology and 
even [uranium] enrichment are our inalienable rights . . . we 
have every right to progress and development.”4 
Certain members of the international community, including 
the United States of America, are suspicious of Iran’s nuclear 
program and its final destination.5 Iran is currently negotiating 
its nuclear program and intention to enrich uranium with the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and 
Germany (P5+1 countries).6 During these negotiations, the 
United States has taken the stance that there is no inherent 
 
  Juris Doctor, University of Minnesota Law School, 2015. B.S., Shiraz 
University, 2012. 
 1. See IAEA and Iran: Chronology of Key Events, IAEA, http://www.
iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events (last visited Sept. 20, 
2015). 
 2. See, e.g., Laura Smith-Spark, Iran, World Powers Start Final Nuclear 
Talks Round Before Deadline, CNN (July 3, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2014/07/03/world/iran-nuclear-talks/. 
 3. Rouhani Reaffirms Iran’s Enrichment Right, PRESSTV (Dec. 7, 2013, 
9:45AM), http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/12/07/338667/rouhani-reaffirms-
iran-enrichment-right/. 
 4. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 5. See Iran Nuclear Crisis: Can Talks Succeed?, BBC, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11709428 (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
 6. See Amir Paivar, Iran Nuclear Negotiations Go into Extra Time, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29220200 (last visited Oct. 4, 
2015). 
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right to enrich uranium for member states of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.7 As Under Secretary of 
State Wendy Sherman stated in a Congressional hearing on 
October 3, 2013: 
It has always been the United States’ position—and I 
have said to my Iranian interlocutors many times—is 
that article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
does not speak about the right of enrichment at all; does 
not speak to enrichment, period. It simply says that you 
have the right to research and development, and many 
countries, including countries like Japan and Germany, 
have taken that to be a right. But the United States does 
not take that position. We take the position that we look 
at each one of these [cases]. And more to the point, the 
UN Security Council resolution has suspended Iran’s 
enrichment until they meet their international 
obligations. They did not say they have suspended their 
right to enrichment. They have suspended their 
enrichment. So we do not believe there is an inherent 
right by anyone to enrichment.8 
The differing positions of states as members of the 
international community leads to a clear question of public 
international law—does a sovereign state that is a party to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have the 
right to enrich uranium? 
This Note seeks to answer this question as applied to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. First, this Note will present an 
introduction to the process of uranium enrichment. Then, it will 
introduce the framework of relevant international law. Finally, 
the analysis section of the Note will examine Iran’s right to 
enrich uranium according to the current international law 
regime. 
 
 7. See Reversing Iran’s Nuclear Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Rel., 113th Cong. 19 (2013) (statement of Wendy Sherman, Under Sec. 
of State for Pol. Aff., Dep’t of State). 
 8. Id. 
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II.   BACKGROUND 
A.  URANIUM ENRICHMENT 
Uranium is a rather heavy,9 naturally occurring element.10 
Natural uranium atoms come with different masses,11 and these 
different types of uranium atoms are called uranium isotopes.12 
Isotopes have similar chemical characteristics, but they differ in 
their physical properties.13 Naturally occurring uranium 
contains 99.3% of the slightly heavier uranium, called U238, and 
around 0.7% of the slightly lighter uranium, U235.14 
Uranium is a radioactive element,15 and the atoms of the 
radioactive elements are also unstable.16 Uranium atoms 
constantly and spontaneously decay through emission of sub-
atomic particles or gamma rays.17 Since uranium is unstable, it 
is a very good candidate to be broken down into lighter and more 
stable atoms. This process is crucial for our purposes because it 
can produce a massive amount of energy.18 Fission is the 
scientific term of art that scientists use for this phenomenon. 
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines 
fission as “[t]he splitting of an atom, which releases a 
considerable amount of energy (usually in the form of heat) that 
can be used to produce electricity.”19 This energy is used in power 
plants to produce electricity and was also used in the atomic 
bombs that the United States dropped on Hiroshima and 
 
 9. What is Uranium? How Does it Work?, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/What-is-
Uranium--How-Does-it-Work-/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
 10. See Uranium, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH, http://www.eoearth.org/view/
article/156796/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 11. See generally id. (explaining that uranium variations stem from the 
number of neutrons in the nucleus). 
 12. See Isotope, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH (July 11, 2007, 9:11 PM), http://
www.eoearth.org/view/article/153924/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Uranium, supra note 10. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Radioactive Element, FREE DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/radioactive+element (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 18. “The isotope U235 is important because under certain conditions it can 
readily be split, yielding a lot of energy.” See Uranium, supra note 10. 
 19. Fission (Fissioning), NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fission-fissioning.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
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Nagasaki.20 In this way, the same energy that can be used to 
produce electricity can also be used to cause a catastrophe. 
The Commission states that “enriching uranium increases 
the proportion of uranium atoms that can be “split” by fission.”21 
As previously mentioned, U235 accounts for around 0.7% of the 
uranium atoms in nature.22 Enrichment is the process that 
increases the percentage of U235.23 Since different isotopes are 
chemically similar, the only way to divide them—in the case of 
separating U235 from U238—is by the difference of their 
physical properties, mainly the difference in mass.24 
Iran uses the gas centrifuge process to enrich uranium.25 
Through this process, uranium in the form of uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6) gas molecules is fed to interconnected 
centrifuge machines.26 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
describes this technical and complicated procedure: 
In this process, UF6 gas is placed in a cylinder and 
rotated at a high speed. This rotation creates a strong 
centrifugal force so that the heavier gas molecules 
(containing U238) move toward the outside of the 
cylinder and the lighter gas molecules (containing U235) 
collect closer to the center. The stream that is slightly 
enriched in U235 is withdrawn and fed into the next 
higher stage, while the slightly depleted stream is 
recycled back into the next lower stage. Significantly 
more U235 enrichment can be obtained from a single-
unit gas centrifuge than from a single-unit gaseous 
diffusion stage.27 
 
 20. See Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Subsequent Weapons Testing, WORLD 
NUCLEAR ASSOC., http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/
Radiation-and-Health/Hiroshima,-Nagasaki,-and-Subsequent-Weapons-
Testing/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
 21. Uranium Enrichment, NUCLEAR REG. COMM., http://www.nrc.gov/
materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 22. See Uranium, supra note 10. 
 23. See What is Uranium? How Does it Work?, supra note 9. 
 24. Uranium Enrichment, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-and-
Fabrication/Uranium-Enrichment/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
 25. Id. (stating that “Iran has sophisticated centrifuge technology”). 
 26. See, e.g., Uranium Enrichment, supra note 21. 
 27. Id. 
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B.  SOVEREIGNTY 
Sovereignty is defined as “supreme dominion, authority, or 
rule” and “the supreme political authority of an independent 
state.”28 Sovereignty may also be described as: 
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by 
which an independent state is governed and from which 
all specific political powers are derived; the intentional 
independence of a state, combined with the right and 
power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign 
interference. Sovereignty is the power of a state to do 
everything necessary to govern itself, such as making, 
executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting 
taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or 
engaging in commerce with foreign nations.29 
The legal definition of sovereignty is tied to the notion of a 
state. “Sovereignty is the power of a state to . . . govern itself.”30 
Thus, to better understand the legal definition of sovereignty, 
one must observe the legal definition of ‘state.’ One definition 
finds that states are “entit[ies] that ha[ve] a defined territory 
and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of 
[their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the 
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such 
entities.”31 
The combination of the definitions of state and sovereignty 
must conclude the definition of sovereign state: 
A sovereign state refers to a state that possesses full 
sovereignty over its affairs, existence, and territory. It is 
complete in itself. A sovereign state is recognized as 
being legitimate nation by the other major nations in the 
world. Major characteristics of a sovereign state are: 
a. a defined territory on which the state exercises 
 
 28. Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 665 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 29. Sovereignty, FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefree
dictionary.com/sovereignty (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 30. Id. (emphasis added). 
 31. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 
F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
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internal and external sovereignty; 
b.  a permanent population; 
c.  a government, not under the control of a foreign power; 
d. independence from other states and powers; and 
e. the capacity to enter into relations with other 
sovereign states.32 
Consistent with this definition, international scholars 
generally agree that four conditions comprise a sovereign state: 
(1) a defined territory; (2) permanent population; (3) an effective 
government; and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states.33 Effective government means that the government 
is able to exercise control over its territory to the exclusion of 
other entities.34 
C.  LIMITATIONS ON A SOVEREIGN STATE 
Sovereignty is not without limitation. International legal 
customs and treaties are well-recognized as binding 
commitments, and may limit the behavior of sovereign states.35 
Besides the well-known sources of international law, new 
doctrines have appeared to impose more restrictions on a 
sovereign. 
For instance, the notion of sovereignty fundamentally 
changed after World War II—one of “the most important 
outcomes of World War II was the general acceptance of the 
principle that States that act as aggressors abuse their 
sovereignty, and their leaders may be accountable directly to the 
international community. The establishment of this principle 
marked a revolutionary change in the scope of sovereignty.”36 
Similarly: 
 
 32. Sovereign State Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.
uslegal.com/s/sovereign-state/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 33. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 
2012). 
 34. Id. at 35. 
 35. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (explaining that the International Court of 
Justice may consider international custom to be evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law, and that this body may use such international custom when 
resolving disputes). 
 36. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of 
Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 141, 160 (2004). 
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At the end of WWII, considerable disquiet was generated 
about the notion of the abuse of State sovereignty and 
the scale of the horror that it generated. The most 
important effort that clearly establishes limits to what 
government can do is reflected in the work of the 
Nuremburg Tribunal. In Nuremburg, the defense that 
the defendants were merely following the orders of the 
sovereign was rejected. The court stressed that behind 
the veil of the sovereign are the finite human agents of 
decision-making. A court of law could therefore penetrate 
the veil of the State and sovereign and hold the decision 
makers accountable. In historic terms, Nuremburg 
established a critical repudiation of the principle of 
sovereign absolutism. It, in effect, repudiated legal 
theories of sovereignty that sought to shield defendants 
from responsibility for mass murder.37 
It is important to note, however, that according to the 
principles adopted by the United Nations Charter, restrictions 
upon the sovereignty of states could not be presumed.38 The 
aforementioned limitation on sovereignty likely only applies 
when humanitarian principles are violated.39 
The next pool of arguments that advocate for limitations 
gained potency in light of concerns regarding peace and security 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks.40 When a 
powerful non-state actor takes refuge in a sovereign state and 
the sovereign state invokes the principle of sovereignty to bar 
the intervention of the targeted state, “[s]tates targeted by 
terrorist acts are reluctant to accept that their responses to such 
attacks are constrained by principles of sovereignty in 
international law.”41 
Many scholars also recognize the concept of “abuse of 
sovereignty.”42 As a result, sovereignty is not a license to kill, to 
make war, or threaten international peace.43 International law 
recognizes sovereigns’ rights, but it also constrains obligations 
 
 37. Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and 
Practice, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 429, 456 (2012). 
 38. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 36, at 154. 
 39. See id. at 160. 
 40. See id. at 170. 
 41. Id. at 170–71. 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 176–77. 
 43. Id. at 177. 
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to a sovereign state.44 Although this argument might have merit 
in some cases, it is hard to imagine that Iran’s uranium 
enrichment program can be related to abuse of sovereignty in 
this sense—i.e., to provide a safe haven for non-state terrorist 
actors. 
Setting aside the debatable legal doctrines for imposing 
limitations on the sovereignty of a state, Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice clearly outlines the 
relevant sources of international law: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance 
with international law such disputes as are submitted to 
it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
b.   international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law; 
c.   the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.45 
Article 38(1)(a) enshrines international conventions a 
source of international law, with subpart 38(1)(b) supplementing 
this list with customary international law. Thus, a sovereign 
state is subject to international custom and the international 
treaties it has signed. In effect, with every international 
convention that a sovereign state accepts, its sovereignty is 
likewise confined. 
1. International Treaties 
Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933. 
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Agency (IAEA),46 which it joined in 1958.47 Iran is also a 
signatory state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT).48 Interpretation of international treaties is 
often controversial, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties aims to lessen this controversy. It prescribes that 
treaties shall be interpreted in good faith49 and “in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”50 The 
Vienna Convention considers “[t]he context for the purpose of 
the interpretation” to be comprised of the text of the treaty, the 
preamble, and annexes.51 The relevant treaties for the purposes 
of this Note are the Statute of IAEA and the NPT. 
a. International Atomic Energy Agency 
The traumatic animosities of the Second World War and the 
dangers of new and powerful atomic technology pushed the 
international community to recognize the need for international 
collaboration through a supra-national organization that 
oversees use of atomic energy. The “genesis [of the IAEA] was 
President Eisenhower’s address to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 8 December 1953.”52 These ideas helped to 
shape the IAEA Statute, which eighty-one nations unanimously 
approved in October 1956.53  
Article III(A)(5) of the IAEA Statute authorizes it “[t]o 
establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that 
special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, 
facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its 
request or under its supervision or control are not used in such 
a way as to further any military purpose.”54 Iran and the IAEA 
 
 46. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Members of the Agency, at 1, 
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/2/Rev.78 (Mar. 20, 2015). 
 47. Id. at 1. 
 48. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
 49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AGENCY: 
THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 1 (1997), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. III, approved 
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signed an agreement for the application of safeguards in 
connection with the NPT which came into force on May 15, 
1974.55 
Article 4 of this Safeguards Agreement specified the manner 
in which the agreement shall be implemented.56 Two of its goals 
were “[t]o avoid hampering the economic and technological 
development of Iran or international co-operation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities” and “[t]o avoid undue interference in 
Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the 
operation of facilities.”57 Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement 
requires the IAEA to protect Iran’s commercial and industrial 
secrets and other confidential information.58 Article 8 demands 
that the agency ask for only the “minimum amount of 
information and data” for its inspections,59 and Article 9 requires 
the agency to “secure the consent of the Government of Iran to 
the designation” of its inspectors.60 Article 7 provides the 
necessary regulatory requirements for the IAEA to implement 
its duties: 
(a) The Government of Iran shall establish and maintain 
a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear 
material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. 
(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in such a manner 
as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has 
been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 
findings of Iran’s system. The Agency’s verification shall 
include, inter alia, independent measurements and 
observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with 
the procedures specified in Part II of this Agreement. The 
Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the 
 
Oct. 26, 1956, 81 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute]. 
 55. IAEA, The Text of the Agreement Between Iran and the Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974) 
[hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]. 
 56. Id. art. IV. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. art. V. 
 59. Id. art. VIII. 
 60. Id. art. IX. 
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technical effectiveness of Iran’s system.61 
Article XII(C) of the IAEA Statute empowers the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA to report a state’s noncompliance with 
safeguards to “all members and to the Security Council and 
General Assembly of the United Nations.”62 The IAEA Board, in 
its 2005 resolution, found “that Iran’s many failures and 
breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards 
Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute 
noncompliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s 
Statute.”63 The IAEA Board also found that Iran’s nuclear 
program raised “questions that are within the competence of the 
Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.”64 
In 2006, the United Nations Security Council considered 
Iran’s nuclear program for the first time65 and demanded “that 
Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing 
activities, including research and development, to be verified by 
the IAEA.”66 The Security Council cautioned Iran that it would 
“adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply 
with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA.”67 Article 
41 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter reads: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to 
give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations.68 
 
 
 61. Id. art. VII. 
 62. See IAEA Statute, supra note 54, art. XII.C. 
 63. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, ¶ 1, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 
Implementation Agreement 2005]. 
 64. Id. ¶ 2. 
 65. See S.C. Res. 1696 (July 31, 2006).  
 66. Id. ¶ 2. 
 67. Id. ¶ 8. 
 68. U.N. Charter art. XXXXI. 
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This provision empowers the Security Council to dictate to 
member states to “call upon the Members of the United Nations 
to apply such measures.”69 Since 2006, the Security Council has 
imposed four sanctions regimes on Iran. These measures have 
heavily restricted Iran’s banking system, investments in or by 
Iran, Iranian aircraft or sea vessels, in- or out-bound cargo, and 
the sale of arms, as well as directly targeting individuals whom 
the Security Council considers to be key figures in Iran’s nuclear 
program.70 
b. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
The NPT was designed to prevent the “wider dissemination 
of nuclear weapons,” foster “peaceful applications of nuclear 
technology,” and take “effective measures in the direction of 
nuclear disarmament.”71 It does so by imposing a system of 
safeguards on non-nuclear weapon state parties;72 member 
states must accept “safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to 
be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.”73 Administering these safeguards is the 
responsibility of the IAEA,74 which monitors the nuclear 
activities of NPT member states accordingly.75 Iran is a member 
of the NPT76 and concluded its Safeguards Agreement with the 
IAEA in 1974.77 
The NPT divides countries into “nuclear-weapon States” 
and “non-nuclear-weapon States.”78 It then mandates that 
nuclear-weapon states: 
[n]ot to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 10 (Dec. 27, 2006). 
 71. NPT, supra note 48. 
 72. Id. art. III, ¶ 1. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA, http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html (last visited Sept. 20, 
2015) (providing a brief overview of the NPT and the IAEA’s role in its 
implementation). 
 75. NPT, supra note 48, art. III, ¶ 1. 
 76. See NPT, supra note 48. 
 77. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55. 
 78. NPT, supra note 48. 
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indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.79 
The NPT demands that non-nuclear-weapon states must 
not receive such weapons or nuclear explosive devices, nor 
control or assist in the manufacture of such weapons or nuclear 
explosive devices.80 
Article III of the NPT states that “[t]he safeguards required 
by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering 
the economic or technological development of the Parties or 
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear 
activities.”81 Article IV of the NPT states that “[n]othing in this 
Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of 
all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty.”82 
Article III of the NPT also mentions that the materials are 
subject to the procedure for safeguards: 
[P]rocedures for the safeguards required by this Article 
shall be followed with respect to source or special 
fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is 
outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this 
Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried 
out under its control anywhere.83 
According to Article III of the NPT, the safeguards “shall be 
applied on all source or special fissionable material.”84 
Accordingly, centrifuges and other enrichment equipment fall 
 
 79. Id. art. I. 
 80. Id. art. II. 
 81. Id. art. III, ¶ 3. 
 82. Id. art. IV. 
 83. Id. art. III, ¶ 1. 
 84. Id. 
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out of the scope of the NPT and its safeguards. 
2. Regional Treaties 
In addition to the NPT, Iran is subject to various regional 
treaties. In 1978, the Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates) signed the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-
operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution85 (Kuwait Convention). This regional convention 
broadly defines “marine pollution” as the “introduction by man, 
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health, 
hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of 
quality for use of sea-water and reduction of amenities.”86 It 
further asks the parties to take all appropriate measures in 
accordance with the convention to prevent, abate, and combat 
pollution of the marine environment.87 
One of Iran’s key nuclear sites is Bushehr Nuclear Power 
Plant (BNPP).88 Bushehr, the capital of Iran’s Bushehr province, 
is a port city located south of Iran along the northern coast of the 
Persian Gulf.89 “German firms started building the Bushehr 
plant in 1975, but work was halted in 1979 following the Iranian 
Revolution. In 1995, Iran and Russia signed a contract to finish 
the plant, although financial, technical and political problems 
led to further delays.”90 According to the IAEA’s report on 
October 30, 2013, BNPP was operating at maximum nominal 
power in October 2013.91 Countries along the Persian Gulf have 
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raised their concerns regarding the safety of BNPP. During a 
closed-door meeting of the Board of Governors of IAEA from 
June 3–7, 2013, both United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia 
voiced safety concerns.92 They were concerned due to their 
geographical proximity to BNPP, which is closer to five Arab 
Persian Gulf capitals than it is to Iran’s capital of Tehran.93 
In accordance with the Kuwait Convention, the Persian Gulf 
states signed the Protocol for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment Against Pollution from Land Based Sources (the 
Protocol) in 1990.94 This Protocol applies to discharges from 
land-based sources within the territories of the parties.95 It 
requires the Persian Gulf countries to develop and implement 
source control programs.96 
3. Customary International Law 
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law defines 
customary international law as law that “results from a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense 
of legal obligation.”97 Based on this definition, customary 
international law exists when two key requirements are met: 
“(1) a relatively uniform and consistent state practice regarding 
a particular matter; and (2) a belief among states that such 
practice is legally compelled.”98 The uniformity and consistency 
of the practice must be evident over some extended period of 
time.99 In addition, international law “rests upon principles of 
sovereignty and consent.”100 Generally, international law is 
comprised of rules that states have accepted via a treaty or 
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otherwise.101 Thus, states must have regarded their practice 
over an extended period of time as the law, if it is a binding 
international custom.102 
Customary international law plays an important role when 
no treaty has been developed to govern a particular topic, when 
certain states are not parties, or when treaties are inadequate.103 
For example, when dealing with environmental concerns 
regarding nuclear activities, customary international law may 
apply limitations on a sovereign with respect to environmental 
concerns.104 
Another source of environmental international law is the 
majority consensus of non-binding resolutions and 
recommendations of international organizations.105 Some of the 
international environmental law principles, derived from non-
binding resolutions and recommendations of international 
organizations, have not been practiced uniformly or consistently 
for a long enough period of time to be considered customary 
international law.106 However, despite questions regarding the 
strength and authority of current international environmental 
principles, such principles are not completely void of legal 
importance.107 
These principles, “which are neither strictly binding nor 
completely void of any legal significance,’ but which in time may 
harden into customary international law,” are referred to as a 
form of ‘soft’ international law.108 “Soft law is a legal 
phenomenon in international law which refers to the non-
binding international agreements or norms which have altered 
the process by which international law has developed over the 
past decade.”109 Two examples of international environmental 
law principles include the precautionary principles and the 
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polluter pays principle. 
The precautionary principle states not to postpone cost-
effective measures to prevent potential environmental harm, 
where there is lack of scientific certainty of such harm but the 
potential damage is serious and irreversible.110 This concept is 
embodied in the fifteenth principle of the Rio Declaration, 
stating “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”111 
The polluter pays principle provides that the polluting state 
must pay the cost of remedying the harm caused by its 
pollution.112 As provided in principle sixteen of the Rio 
Declaration, “national authorities should endeavor to promote 
the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due 
regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.”113 
III.   IRAN’S RIGHT TO ENRICH URANIUM 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has effective control over a 
territory of 1,648,195 square kilometers.114 In this respect, it is 
the eighteenth largest territory in the world.115 As of July 2014, 
its population was 80,840,713.116 Iran—a recognized 
independent international state and United Nations 
member117—has ratified many international accords and 
treaties. In addition, Iran joined the IAEA in 1958118 and is also 
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a signatory state of the NPT.119 
These facts emphasize that Iran fulfills all four 
requirements that international law requires as a sovereign 
state—defined territory, permanent population, effective 
government, and capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.120 Iran’s sovereignty is not in question—the question is 
whether Iran, as a sovereign state, has a right to enrich uranium 
within its territory. 
This issue can be analyzed in two ways. First, whether Iran 
has the positive right to enrich uranium; and second, whether 
Iran is prohibited from enriching uranium. The key difference is 
in the presumption that each question embodies. The first 
question assumes that Iran needs permission to conduct internal 
affairs. The second question, however, presumes that Iran is 
inherently free to conduct an activity unless it is prohibited from 
doing so. Thus, the answer for the second question lies in 
whether Iran is prohibited from enriching uranium. 
The International Court of Justice—in response to being 
asked by the U.N. General Assembly whether “the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under 
international law,”121—stated that the first viewpoint: 
[w]as incompatible with the very basis of international 
law, which rests upon the principles of sovereignty and 
consent; accordingly; and contrary to what is implied by 
use of the word ‘permitted,’ states are free to threaten or 
use nuclear weapons unless it can be shown that they are 
bound not to do so by reference to a prohibition in either 
treaty law or customary international law.122 
This opinion emphasizes that “[i]nternational law rests on 
the principle of the sovereignty of states.”123 Restriction upon 
independent states cannot be presumed,124 and “international 
law leaves to States ‘a wide measure of discretion which is only 
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limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.’”125 
An advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
suggests that Iran, as a sovereign state, is free to enrich uranium 
unless a prohibition of such an activity is shown under 
international law.126 Thus, Iran’s right to enrich uranium is 
presumed unless proven otherwise. The following is a discussion 
of possible prohibitions that international treaties might impose 
on Iran’s enrichment rights. 
A.  INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
As a member of the IAEA and a signatory of the NPT, Iran 
must act within the limits imposed by these commitments.127 
Following Iran’s commitment under Article III of the NPT,128 a 
Safeguards Agreement was negotiated with the IAEA and 
implemented in 1974.129 According to Article II of the NPT, Iran, 
as a non-nuclear party: 
[u]ndertakes not to receive the transfer from any 
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive 
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices.130 
Thus, Iran is bound not to manufacture nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. Article II of the NPT certainly 
constitutes a limitation on Iran’s nuclear program. 
Enriching uranium is the starting point for facilitating the 
use of nuclear energy, however.131 This energy is employed in 
atomic weapons and power plants.132 Although the enrichment 
process is a necessary step in the manufacture of nuclear energy, 
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it does not have to correlate with manufacturing nuclear 
weapons.133 For example, Germany—a member of the NPT—
engages in uranium enrichment,134 and yet is still classified as 
non-nuclear by the NPT.135 
Article IV of the NPT declares that “[n]othing in this Treaty 
shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and 
in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”136 According 
to the Vienna Convention, interpretation of a treaty should be 
contextual, and should include the preamble of the treaty.137 The 
NPT’s preamble states that parties express their support for 
“development and other efforts to further the application, within 
the framework of the IAEA safeguards system”138 and affirms 
that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived 
from development of nuclear explosive devices, should be 
available for peaceful purposes to all NPT parties.139 
Considering the preamble and language of the treaty, even 
if Article IV does not embody the right of a party to enrich 
uranium for peaceful purposes, there is certainly no positive 
prohibition. 
Under Article IV of the NPT, all countries have a right to 
civilian nuclear programs as long as they do not attempt 
to produce weapons programs. Given such, a complete 
ban on the sale or spread of nuclear enrichment and 
processing materials is simply not a viable legal 
possibility . . . there is no means for a complete ban on 
the proliferation of nuclear technologies or dual-use [both 
peaceful and non-peaceful] technologies.140 
In a multitude of reports and resolutions issued by the 
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Director General and Board of Governors of the IAEA, this 
agency accused Iran of failing to meet its obligations under the 
Safeguards Agreement.141 These allegations began in 2003, 
noting that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its 
Safeguards Agreement”142 and continued in the September 24, 
2005 resolution of the Board of Governors, in which it found that 
Iran’s failures constituted direct non-compliance with the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement.143 This resolution further found that 
Iran’s nuclear program raised “questions that are within the 
competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the 
main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.”144 Among others, the IAEA has also accused Iran 
of non-collaboration, failure to report,145 and a lack of candor in 
its communications.146 
Iran has accused the IAEA of “poorly safeguarding 
inspection data and thus tacitly colluding with foreign 
intelligence agencies.”147 According to Article V of the 
Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA must protect Iran’s 
commercial and industrial secrets as well as other confidential 
information.148 Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, the former head of the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), once said: 
[w]e do not say that international inspectors are spies, 
we do not say that the agency is connected to terrorists 
and saboteurs . . . what we are saying is that they do not 
keep data secure. Information on Iran is stored on sites 
that can be infiltrated by hackers in the West . . . .can it 
not be seen how our scientists are assassinated and our 
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[nuclear] sites are sabotaged?149 
The assassination and cyber-attacks that Iranian officials 
refer to are serious and real dangers. Iran has suffered cyber-
attacks to its nuclear sites which may constitute “an [illegal] act 
of force.”150 At least five Iranian nuclear scientists have been 
murdered, most of them by bombs planted on their cars.151 
Iranian and international media have blamed these terrorist 
and cyber-attacks on Israel and the United States.152 
The other concern regarding the safeguards agreement is its 
authority and realm of application. Although the IAEA has 
asked for Iranian cooperation “in order to restore international 
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear 
programme,”153 Iran views many of the IAEA’s requests as 
falling outside the scope of the requirements outlined by the 
safeguard agreements.154 
The safeguards agreement has limited applications. 
According to Article III of the NPT, the safeguards apply only to 
“source or special fissionable material” and “all source or special 
fissionable material.”155 Article IV of the Safeguards Agreement 
provides that these must be implemented in a way “[t]o avoid 
hampering the economic and technological development of Iran 
or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear 
 
 149. Ditto, supra note 147. 
 150. “The 2009 cyberattack by the U.S. and Israel that crippled Iran’s 
nuclear program by sabotaging industrial equipment constituted ‘an act of force’ 
and was likely illegal under international law, according to a manual 
commissioned by NATO’s cyber defense center in Estonia.” See Shaun 
Waterman, U.S.-Israeli Cyberattack on Iran was ‘Act of Force,’ NATO Study 
Found, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2013/mar/24/us-israeli-cyberattack-on-iran-was-act-of-force-
na/?page=all. 
 151. “Although Israel has never acknowledged it, the country’s famed 
espionage agency—the Mossad—ran an assassination campaign for several 
years aimed at Iran’s top nuclear scientists.” See Dan Raviv, U.S. Pushing Israel 
to Stop Assassinating Iranian Nuclear Scientists, CBS NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-pushing-israel-to-stop-assassinating-
iranian-nuclear-scientists/. 
 152. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 153. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant 
provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 5, 
IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/27 (May 22, 2013). 
 154. IAEA, Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the 
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the 
Implementation of Safeguards in Iran, Special Remarks, Comment, ¶ 4, IAEA 
Doc. INFCIRC/786 (Mar. 2, 2010). 
 155. NPT, supra note 48, art. III, ¶ 2. 
2016] THE RIGHT TO ENRICH URANIUM  239 
activities,” and “[t]o avoid undue interference in Iran’s peaceful 
nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of 
facilities.”156 Article V also requires the IAEA to protect Iran’s 
commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential 
information.157 Similarly, Article VIII demands that the IAEA 
shall ask for only the “minimum” amount of information and 
data on its inspections.158 
According to Iran, despite these restrictions, the IAEA 
requests information that goes beyond the agreements. Iran has 
sometimes cooperated with such requests, but it has never 
regarded such cooperation as an obligation.159 
Having considered that the Safeguards Agreement 
between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
governing the relation between the Agency and Iran it 
constitutes the legal basis for cooperation and the 
Agency’s requests should be based on that agreement. 
Thus, it is not clear why the Agency’s requests go[] 
beyond the Safeguards Agreement and even beyond the 
Additional Protocol, although the latter is not being 
implemented by Iran.160 
Notwithstanding the objections that both parties had in 
regards to the implementation of the safeguard agreements, a 
September 2005 IAEA resolution found “that Iran’s many 
failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT 
Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, 
constitute[ed] non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of 
the Agency’s Statute.”161 Further, on February 4, 2006, another 
IAEA resolution requested that the Director General report to 
the Security Council that the Board had asked Iran to respond 
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to outstanding questions related to its nuclear program.162 
Article XII(C), which empowers the Board of Governors of the 
IAEA to announce non-compliance, is worthy of a more detailed 
study. Its most relevant part reads: 
The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the 
Director General who shall thereupon transmit the 
report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call 
upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith 
any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The 
Board shall report the non-compliance to all members 
and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the 
United Nations.163 
In Iran’s case however, no report found Iran in 
noncompliance. Nevertheless, the Board of Governors, 
independently, found that “Iran’s many failures and breaches of 
its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreements, 
as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitutes non-compliance in the 
context of Article XII(C) of the Agency’s Statute.”164 
The Board of Governors’ independent assessment, in which 
it found that Iran was non-compliant, is an extension of the 
Board’s authority and has no clear basis in the Statute of the 
IAEA. This fact fundamentally undermines the legality of 
finding Iran in noncompliance and consequently conveying these 
findings to the Security Council. Before finding non-compliance, 
one of the Board of Governors’ resolutions stated that “all the 
declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and 
that such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”165 
However, in a prior resolution, the Board noted, “the Agency is 
not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared 
nuclear materials or activities in Iran.”166 Basically, there was 
no affirmative evidence of deviation to nuclear weapon 
manufacturing on the Iranian side. Instead, the issue was lack 
of certainty in the viewpoint of the IAEA concerning possible 
undeclared activity or material in Iran. That did not rise to the 
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level of non-compliance, but yet the Board of Governors 
enthusiastically found Iran to be non-compliant—with no clear 
authority to do so. 
While “[r]ecognizing the basic and inalienable right of all 
Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful 
purpose,”167 the IAEA repetitively asked Iran “to suspend all 
further uranium enrichment-related activities.”168 The language 
of the resolutions of the IAEA has slightly changed regarding the 
extent of suspension and right of states to nuclear energy in the 
course of time. However, in its essence, it always recognized the 
right of the member states to develop peaceful nuclear energy 
with due consideration for needs of developing countries and 
within the boundaries of NPT.169 Iran did suspend all 
enrichment related and reprocessing activities in a voluntary, 
confidence-building measure170 from 2003–05. Since then, Iran 
has disregarded this request.171 
There is no need to study the legal basis of the question 
“whether the IAEA has the legal authority to prohibit Iran from 
enriching uranium,” because it has never took such a position. 
Rather, it merely requested a suspension of enriching uranium 
until it can verify Iran’s intention for its nuclear activities. 
However, as noted supra, the IAEA conveyed Iran’s nuclear 
issue to the United Nations Security Council.172 The Security 
Council, in its resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, 
then took the same position as the IAEA.173 It affirmed “that 
Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the 
IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which 
are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful 
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purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding 
questions.”174 
Consequently, the Security Council demanded that Iran 
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, 
including research and development.175 It further expressed “its 
intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied 
with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under 
Article 41 if Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to 
persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the 
requirements of the IAEA.”176 Article 41 of Chapter VII of the 
Charter empowers the Security Council to dictate to the member 
states.177 Iran did not comply with the resolution and since 2006, 
the Security Council has imposed six resolutions on Iran. These 
resolutions enforce heavy sanctions against Iran’s banking 
system, ships, investments, cargoes, and arms sales, as well as 
travel restrictions against individuals whom the Security 
Council considers to be key figures in Iran’s nuclear program.178 
 Legally, can the Security Council demand that Iran 
suspend “enrichment-related and reprocessing activities” or 
impose sanctions on Iran? Both are grounded in its authority 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The issue is that 
none of the reports or resolutions of the IAEA consider Iran’s 
nuclear program as a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
and acts of aggression,” while Chapter VII defines the Security 
Council’s authority to act only in response to threats of this 
kind.179 However, the Security Council has never characterized 
Iran or its nuclear program a “threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, and acts of aggression.”180 
The closest that any Security Council statement comes to 
this standard is a July 2006 resolution that reminded the world 
that it is “concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the 
Iranian nuclear programme, mindful of its primary 
responsibility under the United Nations Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and [] 
determined to prevent an aggravation of the situation.”181 
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According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council 
takes action under the authority that is vested in the Security 
Council from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, after 
determining the existence of a serious threat to peace exists.182 
For example, in the resolution authorizing the Korean police 
action in 1950, the Security Council noted “the armed attack on 
the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,”183 and then 
determined that this action “constitutes breach of the peace.”184 
In 1965, with regards to Southern Rhodesia, the Security 
Council clearly determined “that the situation resulting from 
proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in 
Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave . . . and that its 
continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security.”185 In the more recent case of the Persian Gulf War 
of 1990–91, the Security Council, in Resolution 660, determined 
“that there exists a breach of international peace and security as 
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.”186 Within the time period 
that the Security Council was adopting resolutions against Iran, 
Resolution 1907 determined that “Eritrea’s actions undermining 
peace and reconciliation in Somalia as well as the dispute 
between Djibouti and Eritrea constitute a threat to international 
peace and security.”187 There is no such determination with 
respect to Iran in any resolutions of the Security Council, and 
sanctioning a country without such a finding is contrary to the 
practice of the Security Council. 
There are also serious legal questions regarding the 
authority of the Security Council and whether it has plenary 
authority over international affairs. Even if one assumes that 
the Security Council had the authority to decide Iran’s right to 
enrich uranium, and its actions under the authority of Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter had any legal basis, Iran’s 
right to enrich uranium as a sovereign state, may nonetheless 
not be affected. Despite prior resolutions, the Security Council 
never prohibited Iran from enrichment. It merely demanded 
suspension of enrichment until Iran’s nuclear program “be 
verified by the IAEA.”188 
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In short, according to the IAEA, Iran did not meet its 
obligations under the Safeguards Agreement that it had 
negotiated with the IAEA under the NPT. The IAEA then, 
according to its vested treaty authority (with serious legal 
questions regarding statutory compliance) conveyed Iran’s 
nuclear issue to the Security Council. The Security Council—
again with serious legal questions surrounding the basis for 
action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and after 
demanding Iran suspend all “enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities”—sanctioned Iran only to persuade it to 
cooperate with the international community. Nothing in this 
chain of events suggests that Iran is prohibited from enriching 
uranium. As a result, Iran is merely requested to suspend its 
enrichment program for verification under international law.189 
The following summarizes Iran’s nuclear obligations: “[The 
Security Council,] [d]emands, in this context, that Iran shall 
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, 
including research and development, to be verified by the 
IAEA.”190 If the Security Council’s resolutions were worded in a 
different manner, then Iran might not have the right to enrich 
uranium. However, this is not the case. Iran’s alleged violations 
of the safeguard agreements have merely resulted in heavy 
economic sanctions and requests for conditional suspension of 
uranium-related reprocessing activities. Security Council 
resolutions therefore have not affected Iran’s enrichment rights. 
International law is based on the principles of sovereignty of 
states and their consent.191 International law gives near-
universal discretion to sovereign states,192 unless otherwise 
prohibited by regional treaties or customary international law. 
Since no textual provision of a treaty or Security Council action 
has specifically stated that Iran retains no enrichment 
authority, it undoubtedly retains the right to do so today. 
B.  REGIONAL TREATIES 
Regional treaties have the same authority as international 
treaties. In fact, regional treaties are a special form of 
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international treaties.193 Iran and other Persian Gulf countries 
of the region are subject to the regional treaties they have 
signed—namely the Kuwait Convention and its associated 
protocols. 
Persian Gulf countries have expressed concern regarding 
Iran’s nuclear program, especially regarding the BNPP. In June 
2013, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia raised safety 
concerns during a closed-door meeting with the Board of 
Governors of IAEA.194 The Bushehr plant is closer to five 
Arabian state capitals in the Persian Gulf region than it is to 
Tehran.195 These concerns were escalated after an earthquake 
took place in that region in April 2013.196 “Following the quake, 
the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council [P]GCC called on the 
IAEA to send a specialized technical team to inspect the Bushehr 
nuclear plant and investigate potential damage.”197 Persian Gulf 
countries are also concerned about possible future earthquakes 
and tsunamis.198 In reference to the demand, the former head of 
the AEOI stated that “[t]he request of these countries is a 
political gesture and propaganda. IAEA inspectors are present 
in Iran and monitor Iran’s nuclear activities.”199 Abbasi also 
remarked that the IAEA has not reported any deviation from 
safety standards in BNPP.200 The IAEA has also not publicly 
acknowledged that “[t]he [BNPP] reactor is designed to 
withstand a magnitude 8 earthquake and to automatically shut 
down if there is a major earth movement.”201 
This analysis does not take the potential political issues of 
Persian Gulf countries into account and assumes that they have 
genuine concerns regarding the safety of Iran’s nuclear program. 
The legal aspects of such concerns are presented in treaties and 
customary international law discussed infra. 
Iran is not a signatory to any regional treaty that 
specifically discusses nuclear programs. Admittedly, Iran and 
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other Persian Gulf countries are subject to the Kuwait Regional 
Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution.202 However, the Kuwait 
Convention and its protocols are concerned about pollution of the 
sea area and do not specifically address nuclear pollution.203 
Additionally, no uranium enrichment site is located in the areas 
where Persian Gulf states are focused. The BNPP site also is a 
power plant, not a uranium enrichment facility. Thus, even if 
one assumes that Iran must halt its nuclear activities in areas 
close to other Persian Gulf states due to safety reasons, this 
assumption merely means Iran must shut down sites in such 
geographical areas, not sites in other locations—Natanz for 
example—which is located in the center of Iran204 and is the 
main site for enriching uranium.205 Such safety concerns do not 
affect the substance of Iran’s enrichment rights. These are 
merely safety issues that if valid, should be addressed in a 
limited manner. 
Even if Iran decides to enrich uranium in areas such as the 
BNPP, it would not be prohibited since the Kuwait Convention 
broadly defines pollution.206 The Kuwait Convention does 
require Persian Gulf states to prevent pollution of the sea area, 
but it does not constrain nuclear activities close to the sea. The 
Protocol is mainly concerned about discharges from land-based 
sources207 and it requires the states to develop and implement 
source control programs.208 
Nuclear sites may be within the category of “land-based 
sources” within the definition of the Protocol if any discharge 
reaches the marine environment.209 Iran is bound by the 
Protocol to develop and implement source control programs for 
BNPP if it affects the sea.210 However, as long as Iran maintains 
the safety requirements that the Protocol asks for, the Kuwait 
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Convention and any associated protocol should not prohibit Iran 
from enriching uranium. 
C.  CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOFT LAW 
In an advisory opinion regarding the legality of using 
nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice considered 
all international treaties, international environmental law, 
humanitarian law, and customary international law, finding no 
basis that the use of nuclear weapons was prohibited.211 If the 
use of nuclear weapons is not prohibited by customary 
international law and if sovereign states have not adopted an 
international custom to prohibit use for an extended period of 
time, then a state has most certainly not consented to any 
prohibitions on uranium enrichment. The fact that there are 
ninety-nine licenses for nuclear power plants in the United 
States and that 20% of its electricity212 and 17% of Germany’s 
electricity213 is produced in nuclear power plants is powerful 
evidence that current state practice does not suggest a blanket 
prohibition on uranium enrichment. 
The International Court of Justice studied the potential 
environmental issues related to use of a nuclear weapon and 
held that: 
[w]hile existing international law relating to the 
protection and safeguarding of the environment does not 
specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it 
indicates important environmental factors that are 
properly to be taken into account in the context of the 
implementation of the principles and rules of the law 
applicable in armed conflict.214 
This reasoning applies even more forcefully to peaceful 
nuclear programs and uranium enrichment, which are easier to 
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control. 
Customary international environmental law provides a 
remedy for countries that are harmed as a result of activities in 
the territories of other countries.215 This requires Iran to remedy 
any possible environmental harm its enrichment program may 
have on other countries, but it does not prohibit Iran from 
enriching uranium. Enjoining a particular industry or site 
within the territory of a sovereign state that causes harm to the 
territory of another state is possible in the framework of 
customary international law. However, in very limited cases, it 
is cognizable when there are serious consequences to an injured 
state proven by clear and convincing evidence.216 
Environmental law principles and customary law encourage 
countries to bear the cost of environmental harms they may 
cause.217 They also require a sovereign state to prevent 
environmental degradation.218 Even “lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”219 
Iran is subject to international environmental law and may 
honor its non-binding principles, but international 
environmental law does not specifically prohibit Iran’s uranium 
enrichment program in the midst of a lack of harm. Since an 
injury has not been proven in Iran’s case, enjoining Iran’s 
nuclear program is not currently an option. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The principle of sovereign equality, which is embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations,220 suggests Iran has the same 
rights and responsibilities of other sovereign states of the world. 
As a sovereign state, Iran and all countries of the international 
community are free to exercise sovereignty over their own 
territory. As a result, limitations on sovereign states are not 
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presumed221—they must be proven. Neither treaties nor 
customary international law currently prohibits Iran from 
enriching uranium. 
The right to enrich uranium is not a special right belonging 
to select countries. Sovereign states have not consented to 
discrimination over their ability to develop peaceful nuclear 
technology. All signatory states of the NPT and members of the 
IAEA have the right to enrich uranium unless bound by another 
treaty. Non-recognition of this right is a political question, not a 
legal one, and must be treated as such. 
 
 221. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of 
Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 141, 154 (2004). 
